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CITIZEN SUITS AND THE CLEAN WATER ACT:
HAS ARTICLE III BECOME A PERMANENT ROADBLOCK TO PRIVATE
ENFORCEMENT?
Natural Resources Defense Council v. Southwest Marine, Inc.'
I. INTRODUCTION

Since its enactment in 1972, the Federal Water Pollution Control Act or Clean Water Act
("CWA" or "Act") 2 has become a powerful force in preventing the illegal discharge of pollutants into the
nation's waterways. The CWA provides for both state and private enforcement.' Initial enforcement
action may be effected by the Environmental Protection Agency or an appropriate administrative agency. 4
Absent any state or federal action, the Act provides for private enforcement through citizen-initiated suits
in federal court.5 The citizen suit provision has become a powerful tool by which citizen groups have
prosecuted parties who illegally pollute in violation of the CWA.
Congress added the citizen-suit provision to the CWA to "address the fear that statutory
commitments would be threatened by bureaucratic failure." 6 The hope was that citizen-suits would
provide a supplemental means of enforcing the Act in instances where the government failed to prosecute
alleged polluters. The provision, which for years provided private citizens and organizations with the
statutory means to prevent environmental harm has had its viability brought into question. Recent
decisions have demonstrated a judicial trend towards limiting the effectiveness of citizen suits by
precluding awards of civil penalties in many instances through the doctrines of standing and mootness.'
Natural Resources Defense Council v. Southwest Marine, Inc. presents an important opportunity
for the role of the citizen suit to be further defined by the courts. The decision will provide future
guidance to all those concerned with the practical effectiveness of citizen suits brought to ensure CWA
compliance.
II. FACTS AND HOLDING

Plaintiffs Natural Resources Defense Council, San Diego Baykeeper, Inc., and Kenneth J. Moser
(collectively "NRDC") brought.a CWA action in United States District Court, Southern District of
California, against defendant Southwest Marine, Inc. ("Southwest").' Plaintiffs, comprised of two private
environmental organizations and a private individual, alleged Southwest, a local San Diego shipyard,
violated numerous provisions of the CWA.' 0 Specifically, NRDC alleged that Southwest unlawfully
discharged pollutants from its bayside facility into the San Diego Bay and the Pacific Ocean and, in
addition, failed to prepare and implement several environmental compliance and monitoring programs
required by Southwest's National Pollutant Discharge Elimination System ("NPDES") permit." NRDC
1 28 F. Supp.2d 584 (S.D. Cal. 1998), aff'd on reh'g, 39 F. Supp.2d 1235 (S.D. Cal. 1999).
Federal Pollution Control Act Amendment of 1972, Pub. L. No. 92-500 (codified in 33
U.S.C. §§ 1251-1387 (1994)).
3 Id. at §§ 1319(aX 1), 1365(a).
4 Id. at § 1319(aX).
s Id. at § 1365(a).
6 Cass R. Sunstein, What's StandingAfter Lujan?: OfCitizen Suits, "Injuries,"andAnicle
111, 91 MICH. L. REv. 163, 193
(1992).
7 Id.
8 See Steel Co. v. Citizens for a Better Env't, 523 U.S. 83, 118 S. Ct. 1003 (1998); Friends of the Earth, Inc. v. Laidlaw
Envtl. Servs. (TOC), Inc., 149 F.3d 303 (4 Cir. 1998), cert. granted,_ U.S._, 119 S. Ct. 1111 (1999); and Dubois v. U.S.
Dep't of Agric., 20 F. Supp.2d 263 (D.N.H. 1998), discussed infra at notes 18-136.
9 Natural Resources Defense Council v. Southwest Marine, Inc., 28 F. Supp.2d 584, 584 (S.D. Cal. 1998), aff'd on reh 'g,
1999 WL 155914 (S.D. Cal. 1999).
2

1o Id.

" Natural Resources Defense Council v. Southwest Marine, Inc., 945 F. Supp. 1330, 1330 (S.D. Cal. 1996).
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sought injunctive relief as well as civil damages from Southwest.' 2 In response to NRDC's suit,
Southwest brought a motion in limine to preclude an award of civil penalties ("Motion").13
The issue presented was whether citizen-plaintiffs had standing to seek civil penalties against
alleged violators of the CWA. Southwest contended in its Motion that NRDC's claim for civil penalties
was precluded as a matter of law because plaintiffs in citizen suits lacked standing to seek civil penalties
against alleged violators of the CWA.14 NRDC contended that the Act expressly granted standing to
citizens to bring suit for civil damages."
The district court denied Southwest's Motion, holding that the citizen-plaintiffs had standing to
seek civil penalties under the CWA if they sought injunctive relief for ongoing violations of the Act.' 6
III. LEGAL BACKGROUND

A. Citizen Standing under the Clean Water Act
1. An Overview of the Doctrine of Standing
The focus of the court's decision in NaturalResources Defense Council v. Southwest Marine,Inc.
was whether NRDC had standing to pursue its claim for civil penalties in federal court. Congress enacted
the CWA in 1972 to "restore and maintain the chemical, physical, and biological integrity of the Nation's
waters."' A key provision within the Act states that the CWA may be enforced through private, citizen
suits against alleged violators." This section allows environmental organizations as well as private
citizens to enforce the Act through suits filed in federal court.
Though the CWA provides for citizen-suit enforcement of the Act, it does not allow any citizen
to become a "private prosecutor" who may sue polluters for the common good in the nearest available
forum. For a claim to be heard in federal court, it must be both justiciable 20 and a valid "case or
controversy" 21 under the U. S. Constitution. Specifically, citizen-plaintiffs must meet the justiciability
requirements of standing before enforcing their rights under the Act. Stated generally, the doctrine of
standing addresses the basic question of who may bring a lawsuit in federal court.22 Standing analysis
focuses upon "[wihether a party has a sufficient stake in an otherwise justiciable controversy to obtain
judicial resolution of that controversy." 23 The doctrine requires the court to make a threshold
determination as to whether a specific person is the proper party to bring a matter to federal court for
resolution. 24
12 id.
13 Southwest Marine, 28 F. Supp.2d at 584. The procedural history of
the instant case may be summarized briefly. In 1996,
NRDC filed suit against Southwest for numerous CWA violations. Southwest initially moved to dismiss the suit for lack of
subject-matterjurisdiction. Southwest Marine, 945 F. Supp. at 1330. The Southern District of California denied Southwest's
motion to dismiss. Id. Southwest then filed the instant motion to preclude civil penalties. Id.
14

Id.

" See 33 U.S.C. §§ 1251-1387 (1994)
16 Southwest Marine, 28 F. Supp.2d at 584.
' 33 U.S.C. § 1251(a) (1994).
8 See 33 U.S.C. § 1365(a) (1994). "Except as provided in subsection (b) of this section and section 1319(g) of this title, any
citizen may commence a civil action on his own behalf: (1) against any person (including (i) the United States, and (ii) any other
governmental instrumentality or agency to the extend permitted by the eleventh amendment to the Constitution) who is alleged to
be in violation of (A) an effluent standard or limitation under this chapter or (B) an order issued by the Administrator or a State
with respect to such a standard or limitation[.]" Id.
19 Id.

20 See Flast v. Cohen, 392 U.S. 83, 94-97 (1968). The Court has stated for that for a case to bejusticiable, it "must be
definite and concrete, touching the legal relations of parties having adverse legal interests." Aetna Life Ins. Co. v. Haworth, 300
U.S. 227, 24041 (1937).
21 U.S. CONST. art. m, § 2, cl. 1.
23
24

See Warth v. Seldin, 422 U.S. 490 (1975).
Sierra Club v. Morton, 405 U.S. 727,731 (1972).
id.

2
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The courts have addressed the issue of standing in citizen suits in numerous decisions since the
inception of the CWA.x What has been at the heart of these decisions is the issue of what citizen
plaintiffs must allege in their complaint to meet standing requirements. Over time, courts have differed in
their interpretations regarding how standing requirements may be satisfied under the Act.26
2. The Gwaltney Decisions
The issue which initially faced federal courts was the requisite sufficiency of a citizen-plaintiffs
complaint. Specifically, the issue was whether entirely past violations were actionable under the
citizen-suit provision of the CWA or whether allegations of ongoing violations were required to confer
standing.28 The dispute that defined the courts' reasoning in this area for more than a decade began with
Gwaltney ofSmithfield, Ltd. v. Chesapeake Bay Foundation,Inc." The District Court for the Eastern
District of Virginia's decision in Gwaltney I, along with the suit's subsequent appeal and remand, shaped
the approach to citizen suit standing until the Supreme Court's decision in Steel Co. v. Citizensfor a
Better Environment in 1998.30
In Gwaltney I, the plaintiffs filed suit against defendant Gwaltney of Smithfield, Inc. ("Gwaltney
of Smithfield") for violations of the CWA. 3 ' The plaintiffs alleged violations of Gwaltney of Smithfield's
National Pollutant Discharge Elimination System ("NPDES") permit. 2 The plaintiffs filed suit alleging
that Gwaltney of Smithfield "[had] violated ... [and would] continue to violate its NPDES permit.'
Gwaltney of Smithfield moved for dismissal due to lack of subject-matter jurisdiction arguing that the
language of the CWA required that a defendant be in violation of the Act at the time of the suit.3
Gwaltney of Smithfield asserted that since it had complied with the conditions of its NPDES permit
before the plaintiffs filed suit, the district court lacked subject-matter jurisdiction.35 The Gwaltney I court
rejected Gwaltney of Smithfield's argument, concluding that the CWA authorized citizens to bring
enforcement actions on the basis of wholly past violations. In Gwaltney II, the Fourth Circuit affirmed,
concluding that the Act "can be read to comprehend unlawful conduct that occurred only prior to the
filing of a lawsuit as well as unlawful conduct that continues into the present."37
In Gwaltney III, the Supreme Court granted certiorarito resolve the conflict regarding subjectSee infra notes 27-83.
See infra notes 27-83.
27 See Robert Wiygul, Gwaltney Eight Years Later: ProvingJurisdictionandArticle III Standing
in Clean Water Act Citizen
Suits, 8 TUL. ENvrL. L. J. 435,436 (Summer 1995).
25
26

28 Id.

29 611 F. Supp. 1542 (E.D. Va. 1985). Procedural history of Gwaltney ofSmithfield: Gwaltney of Smithfield,
Ltd. v.

Chesapeake Bay Found., Inc., 611 F. Supp. 1542 (E.D. Va. 1985) ("Gwaltney F"); Chesapeake Bay Found., Inc. v. Gwaltney of
Smithfield, Ltd., 791 F.2d 304 (4" Cir. 1986) ("Gwaltney II"); Gwaltney of Smithfield, Ltd. v. Chesapeake Bay Found., Inc., 484
U.S. 49 (1987) ("Gwaltney III"); Chesapeake Bay Found., Inc. v. Gwaltney of Smithfield, Ltd., 844 F.2d 170 (4 " Cir. 1988)
("Gwaltney IV'); Chesapeake Bay Found., Inc. v. Gwaltney of Smithfield, Ltd., 890 F.2d 690 (4" Cir. 1989) ("Gwaltney V").
3 523 U.S. 83 (1998). See infra notes 54-83.
31 Gwaltney ofSmithfield, 484 U.S. at 54.
32 Id. Pursuant to the CWA, NPDES permits are issued by the Administrator of the Environmental Protection Agency
authorizing the discharge of pollutants into navigable waterways in accordance with specified conditions. 33 U.S.C. § 1342
(1994). Holders of NPDES permits are subject to enforcement action for failure to comply with the conditions of their permit.
Id. § 1319. Enforcement may be pursued by either federal or state government officials. Id. § §1319, 1342(bX7). Germane to
this discussion, in the absence of state or federal action, private citizens may pursue civil action against any individual "alleged to
be in violation of" the conditions of a NPDES permit Id. § 1365(aX 1).
3Gwaltney ofSmithfield, 484 U.S. at 54.
3 Id. at 54-55.
3 Id. at 55. Gwaltney ofSmithfield relied on the Fifth Circuit's decision in Hamker v. DiamondShamrock Chemical,Inc.,
756 F.2d 392, 395 (5d' Cir. 1985), which held that a complaint brought under the citizen suit provision of the CWA "must allege a
violation occurring at the time the complaint is filed." Id.
3 Gwaltney ofSmithfield, 611 F. Supp. at 1547. The district court found that "[t]he words 'to be in violation' may
reasonably be read as comprehending unlawful conduct that occurred solely prior to the filing of the lawsuit as well as unlawful
conduct that continues into the present." Id.
3 Gwaltney ofSmith/ield, 791 F.2d at 309.

3
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matter jurisdiction under the citizen-suit provision of the CWA.3 1 The Court rejected the Fourth Circuit's
interpretation of "to be in violation"39 in Gwaltney II, holding that citizen suits under the CWA may be
maintained only to "enjoin or otherwise abate an ongoing violation."0 The Court reasoned that the
provisions for citizen enforcement "make plain that the interest of the citizen-plaintiff is primarily
forward looking." 4'
The Court split regarding the issue of sufficiency of "ongoing violations" that must be alleged by
citizen-plaintiffs. Justice Marshall, representing the minority, interpreted "to be in violation" to require
that citizen-plaintiffs "allege a state of either continuous or intermittent violation - that is, a reasonable
likelihood that a past polluter will continue to pollute in the future."4 2 The majority interpreted "to be in
violation" as conferring subject-matter jurisdiction for a "good faith allegation" of ongoing violations.4 3
The majority thus determined that ongoing violations must be alleged in the complaint, but not proven.
Upon the remand of Gwaltney III to the Fourth Circuit, the requirements to demonstrate sufficient
ongoing violations were further refined in Gwaltney IV.45
The Supreme Court's decision in Gwaltney III was notable in that throughout its discussion of
standing, the Court focused solely on statutory standing under the CWA. Critics have noted, "The
Gwaltney decision is somewhat confusing because it does not clearly distinguish statutory standing
requirements and standing requirements under Article III of the U.S. Constitution. "6 The requirement of
an ongoing violation is a statutory requirement which, if met, would satisfy subject-matter requirements
in federal court. For standing to be extended, a citizen-plaintiff must not only acquire subject-matter
jurisdiction, but they must also establish standing under Article III. 47 Gwaltney provided no discussion of
standing rejuirements under Article III, and it was more than a decade later before the issue was
addressed.
3. Steel Co. v. Citizensfor a Better Environment
In 1998, the issue of citizen-plaintiff standing in environmental suits was addressed by the
Supreme Court in Steel Co. v. Citizensfor a Better Environment.49 In Steel Co., the plaintiff,
a private non-profit environmental organization ("CBE"), filed suit against the defendant, a steel
manufacturer ("Steel Company"), under the Emergency Planning and Community Right-to-Know Act of
1986w ("EPCRA")." Generally, EPCRA establishes a framework of state, regional and local agencies
designed to inform the public about the existence of hazardous chemicals and provides for emergency
response upon the occurrence of a health-threatening release of these chemicals.5 2 In addition, EPCRA
imposes specific reporting requirements for users of hazardous chemicals.s3 Similar to the CWA, EPCRA
Gwaltney of Smithfield, 484 U.S. at 49.
' 33 U.S.C. § 1365(a) (1994).
4 Gwaltney ofSmithfield, 484 U.S. at 59 (emphasis added).
3

41

Id.

Id. at 57.
Id. at 65.
Id. The Court's split was important when analyzing future complaints by citizen plaintiffs following Gwaltney of
Smith/ield - but is not genrane to this discussion.
4 Gwaltney ofSmithfield, 844 F.2d at 170. The Fourth Circuit provided that citizen-plaintiffs may demonstrate the existence
of an ongoing violation either "(1) by proving violations that continue on or after the date the complaint is filed, or (2) by
adducing evidence from which a reasonable trier of fact could find a continuing likelihood of a recurrence in intermittent or
sporadic violations." Id. at 171-172.
4 Wiygul, supm note 27, at 448.
47 Save Our Community v. U.S. E.P.A., 971 F.2d 1155, 1160-61 (51 Cir. 1992).
4 Wiygul, supra note 27, at 442.
4 523 U.S. 83 (1998).
Emergency Planning and Community Right-to-Know Act of 1986, 42 U.S.C. §§ 11001-11050 (1994).
Steel Co. v. Citizens for a Better Env't, 523 U.S. 83, _, 118 S. Ct. 1003, 1008 (1998).
52 Steel Co., 118 S. Ct at 1009.
" 42 U.S.C. §§ 11022,11023 (1994).
42
4
4

4
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contains a provision for citizen-suit enforcement. 4 Pursuant to this provision, CBE filed suit against
Steel Company for alleged violations of EPCRA seeking injunctive relief and civil penalties." CBE
alleged that Steel Company used and disposed of hazardous chemicals without filing reports required by
EPCRA.56 Steel Company moved to dismiss the suit, arguing that all EPCRA violations had been cured
by the time CBE filed suit, thus CBE's suit could not stand as it alleged solely past violations.s7 The
district court, relying on the Supreme Court's holding in Gwaltney III, granted Steel Company's motion.58
CBE appealed and the Seventh Circuit reversed.' 9 The Seventh Circuit, refusing to apply the holding of
Gwaltney III, denied Steel Company's motion to dismiss holding that CBE could maintain a suit for
wholly past violations of EPCRA.6 0
The Supreme Court granted certiorariand vacated the Seventh Circuit's ruling. 6' In the process,
Steel Co. redefined the analysis the Court employed in examining standing in citizen-suit cases under .
environmental statutes. The Court rebutted the reasoning in Gwaltney III and established a new process
for reviewing standing in citizen-suit cases.62 Unlike Gwaltney III where statutory subject-matter
jurisdiction was discussed first, the Court in Steel Co. emphasized that courts should determine whether
Article III standing exists before reviewing issues of statutory subject-matter jurisdiction.
The Court continued by outlining the requirements for standing under Article III and then
examined CBE's complaint to determine whether it met those requirements. As stated in Steel Co., the
requirements for standing under Article III are injury in fact," causation,65 and redressability.6 6 The
Court failed to reach an analysis of the first two requirements finding that CBE failed to meet the third
element of standing, redressability6 7 because its complaint failed to allege any ongoing violations.6 8 Had
a "continuing violation" been alleged the claim for injunctive relief would have satisfied the redressability
requirement.69 The Court also reviewed CBE's request for civil penalties. 70 Additionally, the Court
found that civil penalties under EPCRA did not satisfy the redressability requirement of Article II. 7 ' The
Court noted that these penalties, payable to the United States Treasury - not CBE - did not suffice to
remedy CBE's injuries:72
Steel Co., 118 S. Ct. at 1009.

5

5 Id.
6Id. at
5

60
61

1008-09.

Id. at 1009.
Citizens for a Better Env't. v. Steel Co., 1995 WL 758122 at *2, *5 (N.D. Ill. 1995).
Citizens for a Better Env't. v. Steel Co., 90 F.3d 1237 (7" Cir. 1996).
Id. at 1244.
See Janet A. Brown, Spring 1998 Term: Steel Company v. Citizensfor a BetterEnvironment, 4 ENVIRONMENTAL

LAWYER

957(1998).
62 Id. at 967-69. Justice Stevens in his concurrence argues that the Court should have decided the issue of statutory
jurisdiction before reaching the constitutional issue of Article Ul standing. Stevens cites extensively to Gwaltney of Smithfield to
supprt his position. Id.
Id. at 964. "The Court embark[s] [first] on an extended digression in an effort to debunk Justice Stevens' argument in
favor of resolving the statutory merits question before the standing issue." Id.
6 Whitmore v. Arkansas, 495 U.S. 149, 155 (1990).
65 Simon v. E. Kentucky Welfare Right Org., 426 U.S. 26,41-42 (1976).
6

Id. at 45-46.

Steel Co. v. Citizens for a Better Env't., 523 U.S. 83 , 118 S. Ct. 1003, 1017-19 (1998). CBE's complaint asked for "(1)
a declaratory judgment that petitioner violated EPRCA; (2) authorization to inspect periodically petitioner's facility and records.
. .; (3) an order requiring a petitioner to provide respondent copies of all compliance records submitted to the EPA; (4) an order
requiring petitioner to pay civil penalties of $25,000 per day for each violation of §§ 11022 and 11023; (5) an award of all
respondent's 'costs, in connection with the investigation and prosecution of this matter. . .'; and (6) any such further relief as the
court deems appropriate." Id. This note will not examine the Court's discussion of claims (1), (5) and (6) above [Steel Co., 118
S. Ct. at 10201.
( Id. at 1019. The Court found that the claim for injunctive relief "cannot conceivably remedy any past wrong but is aimed
at deterring petitioner from violating EPCRA in the future." Id.
67

69

Id.

70

Id. at 1018-19.

71

Id.

72Id.

5

MELPR, Vol. 7, No. 1

But although a suitor may derive great comfort and joy from the fact that the United States
Treasury is not cheated, that a wrongdoer gets his just desserts, or that the nation's laws are
faithfully enforce, that psychic satisfaction is not an acceptable Article III remedy because it does
not redress a cognizable Article III injury."
Thus disposing of each remedy sought by CBE, the Court concluded that "respondent lacks standing to
maintain this suit, and that we and the lower courts lack jurisdiction to entertain it." 74
In Steel Co., the Supreme Court detailed its approach to analyzing standing for environmental
suits involving citizen-plaintiffs. Though its analysis differed from Gwaltney III, the Court in Steel Co.
reached a substantially similar result.75 Gwaltney III and Steel Co. both concluded that citizen-plaintiff's
lack standing to seek civil penalties for wholly past violations of environmental statutes.76 In regards to
standing, the conclusions reached in both decisions limited citizen claims to suits alleging ongoing
violations on the part of the defendant .
B. Mootness in Clean Water Act Citizen-Suits
1. An Overview of the Doctrine ofMootness
It is well established that once a plaintiff demonstrates standing to sue, the court's inquiry into the
justiciability of the claim is not closed. The Supreme Court has stated, "Under Article III of the
Constitution, federal courts may adjudicate only actual, ongoing cases or controversies." 7 Thus, for a
case to remain justiciable, a plaintiff must not only satisfy standing requirements at the time the suit is
commenced, but must also satisfy these requirements throughout the life of the case. The controversy
"must be extant at all stages of review, not merely at the time the complaint is filed." 79 The requirement
that a controversy not be moot is closely tied to that of standing. The Supreme Court has described
mootness as "the doctrine of standing set in a time frame: The requisite personal interest that must exist
at the commencement of the litigation (standing) must continue throughout its existence (mootness)."'0
Accordingly, if a once justiciable controversy becomes moot, the court loses jurisdiction over the suit and
must dismiss."
The doctrine of mootness is crucial to the justiciability of citizen-suit claims under the CWA.
This becomes evident when one examines the typical citizen-suit complaint alleging violations of the
CWA. In Steel Co. v. Citizensfor a Better Environment, the Supreme Court established certain
requirements that a citizen-plaintiff must satisfy to survive the threshold issue of standing.82 Namely, a
plaintiff must allege an ongoing violation on part of the alleged violator along with any allegations of past

7

Id.

14

Id. at 1020.

" Gwaltney ofSmithfield involved a suit brought under the CWA citizen-suit provision. See 33 U.S.C.

§ 1365(a) (1994).
Steel Co. involved a suit filed pursuant to the citizen-suit provision or EPCRA. See 42 U.S.C. § 11046(a)(1) (1994). Though the
provisions differ in form, they are substantially similar enough to allow a comparison between the two cases. See Steel Co., 523
U.S. 83_, 118 S. Ct. 1003 (1998) (Stevens, J., concurring).
76 Steel Co., 118 S. Ct at 1019. Alleged ongoing violations would satisfy the redressability requirement for citizen-plaintiffs
injunctive claims. Id. It is not apparent whether allegations of ongoing violations would satisfy standing requirements for civilpenalty claims.
7 See Philip Weinberg, Are StandingRequirements Becoming a Great BarrierReefAgainst EnvironmentalAction?, 7
N.Y.U. ENvT. L. J. I (1999); George Van Cleve, CongressionalPower to Confer BroadCitizen Standing in Environmental
Cases, 29 ENvrL. L. REP. 10028 (1999); Ann E. Carlson, Standingfor the Environment,45 U.C.L.A. L. REv. 931 (1998).
78

Lewis v. Continental Bank Corp., 494 U.S. 472,477 (1990).

7

Arizonans for Official English v. Arizona, 520 U.S. 43 (1997).

0 Id. at 67.
81

See Boston and Maine Corp. v. Brotherhood of Maintenance of Way Employees, 94 F.3d 15, 20 (l1 Cir. 1996).
See Steel Co., 118 S. Ct at 1017-20.

6
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wrongdoing.83 The typical citizen-complaint requests relief in the form of civil penalties4 for any past
and continuing violations of the Act in addition to injunctive relief to force the alleged violator to
discontinue its ongoing, unlawful conduct.
Frequently the alleged violator will discontinue its wrongful actions, and a reviewing court must
then determine whether the plaintiffs complaint remains justiciable. The key inquiry concerns when the
alleged violator discontinued its wrongful conduct. There are three likely scenarios of defendant
compliance (or noncompliance) and how this will affect justiciability.ss The Supreme Court's changing
approach to the justiciability of citizen-suits under the CWA may seriously undermine the original
purpose of the Act.
2. The Effect of Pre-ComplaintCompliance by Defendants
The first scenario is the situation in which the alleged violator of the CWA discontinues its
wrongful conduct before the citizen complaint is filed. The court's determination in this situation is clear
after Gwaltney III and Steel Co. Both decisions determined that standing would not be conferred in
citizen-suits alleging solely past violations of the Act. 6 Therefore, a citizen-plaintiff's request for civil
penalties and injunctive relief would fail, not for becoming moot, but for failure to meet the requirements
of standing."
3. The Effect ofNon-Compliance by Defendants
A second possible scenario may arise when a complaint is filed by a citizen-plaintiff alleging past
and ongoing violations of the CWA and the alleged violator never ceases its unlawful conduct. Here is
where the courts' interpretation of mootness becomes unclear. Separating the relief requested in the
citizen-plaintiff's complaint will aid analysis. It is clear that a plaintiffs request for injunctive relief will
survive. Under both Gwaltney III88 and Steel Co.,89 allegations of continuing violations will not moot a
claim for injunctive relief. Whether the citizen-plaintiff's claim for civil penalties will remain justiciable
is unclear after Steel Co."
4. The Effect of Post-CompliantCompliance by Defendants
The third and most troublesome scenario arises when the citizen-plaintiff files suit alleging
ongoing violations and after the complaint is filed, the defendant comes into compliance with the Act.
Again, separating the citizen-plaintiff's requested relief will aid analysis. It is clear that at this point the
plaintiffs claim for injunctive relief is moot.9' The key issue remains whether a plaintiff's claim for civil
penalties remains justiciable after the mooting of the claim for injunctive relief.
The Supreme Court's decision in Gwaltney III did not answer this question. The Court's
ambiguous comments on mootness in the context of CWA actions provided little help to the lower
courts.9 The Court merely commented on compliance after filing of plaintiffs suit, stating:
"Longstanding principles of mootness, however, prevent the maintenance of suit when 'there is no
8 See Gwaltney of Smithfield, Ltd. v. Chesapeake Bay Found., Inc., 484 U.S. 49 (1987); and, Steel Co., 523 U.S. 83_, 118
S. CL 1003 (1998).

See 33 U.S.C. § 1319(d) (1994).
8 See Jim Hecker, EPCRA Citizen Suits After Steel Co. v. Citizensfor a Better Environment, 28 ENvn.. L. REP. 10306
'

(1998). The Note will assume a citizen-plaintiff complaint is seeking solely injunctive relief and civil damages.
See Gwaltney ofSmithjield, 484 U.S. at 58; Steel Co., 113 S. Ct. at 1017-20.
Hecker, supra note 91.
8 Gwaltney ofSmithfield, 484 U.S. at 64.
8 Steel Co., 118 S. Ct at 1019.
8

87

9 An analysis of the justiciability of citizen-suit claims for civil penalties will be deferred until later in this section.
91See Jim Hecker, Citizen Standing to Suefor PastEPCRA Violations, 27 ENvTL. L. REP. 10561 (1997).
9 See Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc. v. Texaco Ref. and Mktg., Inc., 2 F.3d 493, 507 n.7 (3 rd Cir. 1993).
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reasonable expectation that the wrong will be repeated'" 93 It was not until Gwaltney III was remanded
that a definitive rule was established regarding the justiciability of civil penalty claims upon the mooting
of the injunctive claim. In Gwaltney V, the Fourth Circuit concluded that subsequent compliance after the
filing of the complaint did not moot the claim for civil penalties.9" The court found that civil penalties
redressed a citizen-plaintiff's injuries.95 The court interpreted the language of the citizen-suit provision in
the Act" along with the language of the civil penalty provision9 7 as allowing the court to assess damages
once an ongoing violation is shown." In other words, the court determined that penalties could be
assessed for past violations of the CWA if the plaintiff established an ongoing violation at the time the
suit was filed - subsequent compliance would not moot this right.99
Following the Fourth Circuit's decision in Gwaltney V, a majority of the lower courts held that
post-complaint compliance did not render citizen-plaintiffs claims for civil damages moot under the
CWA."0 Many courts based their findings on the public policy behind the citizen-suit provision of the
Act.' 1 They reasoned that precluding civil penalties in these situations would discourage future citizensuits if defendants were able to avoid civil damages by simply complying with the CWA after the
complaint was filed.'" For nearly a decade, the Fourth Circuit's decision in Gwaltney V was followed
nearly unanimously.
The justiciability of civil-penalty claims, which seemed secure following Gwaltney V, was put
into question by a recent decision out of the Fourth Circuit. In Friendsof the Earth, Inc. v. Laidlaw
EnvironmentalServices (TOC), Inc., the Fourth Circuit changed its reasoning from Gwaltney Vand
determined that a citizen-suit claim for civil penalties became moot upon the mooting of a plaintiff's
injunctive claim.'0 3
In Laidlaw, the plaintiffs brought a CWA action against the defendants for ongoing violations of
defendants' NPDES permit. 1o4 The district court awarded the plaintiffs civil penalties due to the
defendants' violations at the time the suit was filed.' 5 The court denied the plaintiffs' request for
injunctive relief, finding that the defendants had voluntarily complied with their NPDES permit shortly
after the plaintiffs filed their complaint, thus making the injunctive claim moot.'" The plaintiffs
subsequently appealed the size of the civil penalty award, but did not appeal the denial of the
injunction.' 0 7 The Fourth Circuit, citing Steel Co.,'0 8 stated that the plaintiffs' claim for civil penalties
Gwaltney ofSmithfield, 484 U.S. at 66 (quoting U.S. v. W.T. Grant Co., 345 U.S. 629, 633 (1953)).
Chesapeake Bay Found., Inc. v. Gwaltney of Smithfield, Ltd., 890 F.2d 690, 696 (4 a Cir. 1989). "In our view, the penalty
factor keeps the controversy alive between plaintiffs and defendants in a citizen suit, even though the defendant has come into
comgliance and even though the ultimate judicial remedy is imposition of civil penalties assessed for past acts of pollution." Id.
Id. at 695. "[T]he judicial relief of civil penalties, even if only payable to the United States Department of the Treasury, is
causally connected to a citizen-plaintiffs injury." Id. (citing Sierra Club v. Simkins Indus., Inc., 847 F.2d 1109, 1113 (41h Cir.
198Q).
33 U.S.C. § 1365(a) (1994).
9
9

7 Id. at § 1319(d).
9 Gwaltney ofSmithfield, 890 F.2d at 697.
9 Wiygul, supra note 28, at 453.
' See Atlantic States Legal Found. v. Tyson Foods, 897 F.2d 1128, 1135 (11th Cir. 1990); Atlantic States Legal Found. v.
Stroh Die Casting Co., 116 F.3d 814, 820 (7th Cir. 1997); Carr v. Alta Verde Indus., Inc., 931 F.2d 1055, 1065 n.9 (5th Cir.
1991); Atlantic States Legal Found. v. Pan Am. Tanning Corp., 993 F.2d 1017, 1021 (2d Cir. 1993); Molokai Chamber of
Commerce v. Kukui (Molokai), Inc., 891 F. Supp. 1389, 1406 (D. Haw. 1995); Beartooth Alliance v. Crown Butte Mines, 940 F.
Supp. 1168, 1176 (D. Mont. 1995); Public Interest Research Group of N.J. v. Hercules, Inc., 830 F. Supp. 1525, 1537 (D.N.J.
1993).
'0 See Beverly M. Smith, The Viability ofCitizens' Suits Underthe Clean WaterAct After Gwaltney ofSmithfield v.
Chesapeake Bay Foundation,40 CASE W. REs. L. REv. 1, 57-58 (1989).
102 See Matthew M. Werner, Mootness and Citizen Suit Civil Penalty Claims Underthe Clean Water Act: A Post-Lujan
Reassessment,25 ENvT. L. 801, 808-11 (1995).
303 149 F.3d 303 (4h Cir. 1998).
- in Friends of the Earth, Inc. v. Laidlaw Envtl. Servs. (TOC), Inc., 149 F.3d 303, 305 (4h Cir. 1998), cert. granted, _ U.S. _
119 S. CL 1111 (1999).
i05 Friends of the Earth, Inc. v. Laidlaw Envtl. Servs. (TOC), Inc., 956 F. Supp. 588, 600-11 (D.S.C. 1997).
'0 Laidlaw, 149 F.3d at 305.
107 Id.
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became moot as well because "the only remedy currently available to Plaintiffs - civil penalties payable
to the government - would not redress any injury Plaintiffs have suffered."'"0 Therefore, unlike in
Gwaltney V, the Fourth Circuit determined that the mooting of an injunctive claim did moot a claim for
civil penalties in CWA citizen suits.
Laidlaw is most noteworthy due to its adoption of the Supreme Court's statement in Steel Co. that
civil penalties alone could not redress a citizen-plaintiffs injuries in a CWA suit."o These two decisions
have called into question the viability of all future citizen suits that seek civil penalties - in particular, the
justiciability of civil penalty claims following post-complaint compliance by the defendant.
Two different scenarios exist for post-complaint compliance by defendants in CWA citizen suits.
A defendant's compliance may come as a result of voluntary cessation of its unlawful activities or as a
result of a court order. As established above, termination of unlawful activities will moot a plaintiffs
claim for injunctive relief."' The question remaining after Steel Co. and Laidlaw is whether any
plaintiff's claim for civil penalties will remain justiciable.
In the wake of Steel Co. and Laidlaw, it appears that defendants may avoid the imposition of civil
penalties by simply ceasing all unlawful activities after the citizen-plaintiff files suit. Interpreting Steel
Co. broadly, the discontinuation of unlawful activities would moot a plaintiffs injunctive claim and
accordingly moot its civil-penalty claim." 2 Avoidance of civil liability in this circumstance appears
manifestly unjust to the plaintiff. Fortunately, voluntary-cessation exception to mootness provides
citizen-plaintiffs some protection from this result.'13 The voluntary-cessation exception provides that
where a defendant voluntarily ceases illegal activities after the filing of a complaint but before
adjudication simply to avoid liability, a plaintiffs claims will remain justiciable against the defendant
despite its compliance. 114
The voluntary-cessation exception has been applied in citizen-suits filed under CWA, in which
courts have found that mooting of an injunctive claim due to a defendant's voluntary compliance will not
moot an action for civil penalties. "' In Comfort Lake Association, Inc. v. Dresel Contracting,Inc., the
Eighth Circuit stated "even if a polluter's voluntary permanent cessation of the alleged violations moots a
citizen suit claim for injunctive relief, it does not moot a related claim for civil penalties.""'6 This result
appears just and in the spirit of the voluntary cessation exception."'
Following Steel Co. and Laidlaw, the protection that the voluntary-cessation exception will afford
citizen-plaintiffs in the future may be in jeopardy. Dresel Contracting,decided before Steel Co., provided
that a plaintiffs civil-penalty claims would remain justiciable upon a defendant's voluntary cessation of
its unlawful conduct."' Steel Co. held that citizen-suit claims for civil penalties alone would not stand for
failure to meet Article III redressability requirements.' 19 Laidlaw, in applying Steel Co., determined that
the voluntary cessation of illegal activities would moot not only a citizen-plaintiff's injunctive claim, but

10

'"

See supra note 77.
Laidlaw, 149 F.3d at 306-07.

Id.
"' Hecker, supra note 91.
"o

12

See Laidlaw, 149 F.3d at 306-07.

"' See infra note 120.

See Northeastern Fla. Chapter of the Associated Gen. Contractors of Am. v. Jacksonville, 508 U.S. 656, 661 (1993).
See Atlantic States Legal Found., Inc. v. Stroh Die Casting Co., 116 F.3d 814, 820 (7" Cir. 1997); Natural Resources
Defense Council v. Texaco Ref. & Mktg., Inc., 2 F.3d 493, 502-03 (3" Cir. 1993); Atlantic States Legal Found., Inc. v. Pan Am.
Tanning Corp., 993 F.2d 1017, 1021 (2""' Cir. 1993); Carr v. Alta Verde Indus. Inc., 931 F.2d 1055, 1065 n. 9 (5"' Cir. 1991);
Atlantic States Legal Found. v. Tyson Foods Inc., 897 F.2d 1128 (11"' Cir. 1991); Pawtuxent Cove Marina Inc. v. Ciba-Geigy
Cora., 807 F.2d 1089, 1094 (1st Cir. 1986).
Comfort Lake Ass'n, Inc. v. Dresel Contracting, Inc., 138 F.3d 351, 356 (4 Cir. 1998).
" See Boston Teachers Union, Local 66 v. Edgar, 787 F.2d 12 (1st Cir. 1986). "This exception is meant to prevent
defendants from defeating a plaintiffs efforts to have its claims adjudicated simply by stopping their challenged actions, and then
resuming their 'old ways' once the case [becomes] moot." Id. at 16.
"
"

"' Dresel Contracting,138 F.3d at 356.
"l9

Steel Co. v. Citizens for a Better Env't., 523 U.S. 83, _, 118 S. Ct. 1003, 1017-20 (1998).
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it would also moot its civil-penalty claim as well.120 Clearly, these cases stand in opposition to one
another. The applicability of the voluntary-cessation exception after the Supreme Court's decision in
Steel Co. and the Fourth Circuit's decision in Laidlaw will require a reevaluation of the Eighth Circuit's
reasoning in Dresel Contracting.121
Another scenario of post-complaint compliance arises when a citizen-plaintiff files suit alleging
ongoing violations of the CWA and compliance results from the issuance of a court order. This situation
may arise when a plaintiff files suit seeking injunctive relief and civil penalties, and the court, before
ruling on the civil penalty claim, grants the plaintiff's injunction terminating the defendant's unlawful
conduct. The issue presented after Steel Co. is whether the civil-penalty claim remains justiciable. In this
situation, it appears clear that a plaintiff should not lose its right to a ruling on the civil-penalty claim
because of the court's initial ruling on the plaintiff s injunctive claim. This logic too may
be weakening,
however, after the recent decision in Dubois v. US Department ofAgriculture.12 2
In Dubois, the plaintiffs filed suit alleging, among other claims, violations of the CWA, and
sought injunctive relief and civil penalties for these violations.123 The district court granted plaintiffs'
injunction,'2 but denied civil penalties.1 25 The procedural context of Dubois is notable. By alleging
ongoing violations of the CWA that existed at the time the suit was filed, the plaintiffs appeared to have
met all standing requirements to recover civil penalties. The court, presented with numerous claims
against the defendants, chose to rule on the plaintiffs' claim for injunctive relief first.'2 The court
granted the injunction, then analyzed the remaining claim for civil penalties. 2 7 Relying on Steel Co. and
Laidlaw, the court ruled that granting the plaintiffs' injunction mooted its claim for civil penalties.'12 The
court, quoting Steel Co., stated that "civil penalties stemming from a prior injury to a citizen-suit
plaintiff,
but not payable to that plaintiff, do not redress any legitimate Article III injury."' 29
The reasoning employed in both Laidlaw and Dubois places all future citizen-suit claims for civil
damages under the CWA in jeopardy. After Laidlaw and Dubois, one must wonder whether any context
exists where civil penalties will be recoverable by plaintiffs in CWA citizen-suits. The Dubois court
clearly recognized the implication of its decision on future citizen-suits, but chose to defer the
implications of its decision to another court at a later time.130 An appropriate dispute soon arose, and the
District Court for the Southern District of California was presented with the opportunity to further define
the role of the citizen suit in CWA actions.
IV. INSTANT DECISION

In Natural Resources Defense Council v. Southwest Marine,Inc., the District Court for the
Southern District of California held that civil penalties were recoverable in CWA citizen suits if plaintiffs

120 Friends of the Earth, Inc. v. Laidlaw Envtl. Servs. (TOC), Inc., 149 F.3d 303,
305 (4 " Cir. 1998), cert. granted,_ U.S_
S19S. Ct. 1111 (1999).
21 See supra notes 190-191.
22 20 F. Supp.2d 263 (D.N.H.
1998).
'2

Dubois v. U.S. Dept of Agric., 20 F. Supp.2d 263,265 (D.N.H. 1998).
CV-65-50-B (D.N.H. May 5, 1997).

124 Dubois v. U.S. Dept of Agric.,
125 Dubois, 20 F. Supp.2d
at 268.
126 Id. at 265.
127

Id.

Id. at 266-70. "I conclude that the plaintiffs have failed to establish that the imposition of civil penalties against
[defendants] would redress any harm that the plaintiffs either have previously suffered or imminently fact. Their action,
therefore, is moot." Id. at 269.
'2 Id. at 266 (quoting Steel Co., 18 S. CL at 1019).
'" Dubois, 20 F. Supp.2d at 267 n. 3. "One could arguably read Steel Co. more
broadly to provide that civil penalties payable
to the goverment for past violations cannot redress a citizen-suit plaintiff's injuries, regardless of whether violations are ongoing
when suit is commenced. [Plaintiff] does not make this argument, however, and I need not address it here as I ultimately
conclude that plaintiffs' claim for civil penalties is moot, regardless of whether they had standing to seek such penalties when suit
was brought." Id.
12
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alleged ongoing violations of the Act at the time the complaint was filed. 13 ' The court based its decision
on the Supreme Court's decision in Gwaltney III which concluded that citizen-plaintiffs could seek civil
penalties when also seeking injunctive relief against a defendant alleged to be involved in an ongoing
violation of the CWA. 32 The court concluded that Gwaltney III was dispositive in the case at bar and the
cases cited by Southwest in opposition to NRDC's claim for civil penalties were distinguishable from the
instant controversy.1
The court first examined the Supreme Court's decision in Steel Co. v. Citizensfor a Better
Environment.'4 The court summarized the holding in Steel Co. as follows: "a plaintiff does not have
standing to bring a claim for civil penalties with wholly past violations." 3 3 The court found that Steel Co.
did not overturn the Supreme Court's decision in Gwaltney III which stated that allegations of ongoing
violations would confer standing to citizen-plaintiffs.3' In the instant case, NRDC alleged not only past
violations of the CWA on Southwest's part but also ongoing violations of the Act. 3 7 Accordingly, the
court reasoned that Steel Co. did not preclude NRDC's claim for civil penalties.
The court next analyzed Steel Co.'s analysis of standing in the wake of Gwaltney; specifically,
Steel Co.'s approach to deciding Article III jurisdiction prior to statutory subject-matter jurisdiction. 3
The court cautiously read the Supreme Court's approach to standing in citizen-suit cases under the
CWA.'39 In Steel Co., the Supreme Court held that a citizen-suit claim for civil penalties alone would not
be justiciable for failure to redress a plaintiffs injuries under Article III. 1 The Supreme Court also stated
that a claim for injunctive relief would be justiciable if a plaintiff alleged adequate ongoing violations of
the Act.14' The court in Southwest Marine,though not rejecting Steel Co.'s analysis, reasoned that such a
searching examination of a citizen-plaintiff's claims was unnecessary.14 2 The court found that the
language of Article III did not mandate an individualized analysis of each remedy sought by the party.143
The court stated: "A party either has standing for the purposes of the 'case or controversy' requirement of
Art. III or it does not."' Based on the facts of the instant case, the court found that a microscopic
analysis of each remedy sought proved unnecessary.145 Determining that NRDC had standing to bring
suit for injunctive relief and civil damages by alleging ongoing violations of the CWA, the court reasoned
that justiciability of the injunctive claim would not affect the standing of either remedy sought. 46
The court next discussed the applicability of Friends of the Earth, Inc. v. Laidlaw Environmental
Services (TOC), Inc. on the instant controversy.14 7 Laidlaw involved a scenario in which the defendants
ceased their wrongful action after the filing of the suit but before trial.m' The court in Laidlaw found the
plaintiffs' civil penalty and injunctive claims moot, stating that civil penalties alone would not redress the
131 Natural Resources Defense Council v. Southwest Marine, Inc., 28 F. Supp.2d 584, 587 (S.D.
Cal. 1998), aff'd on re'g,
1999 WL 155914 (S.D. Cal. 1999).

1

Id. at 586.

'33

Id.
523 U.S. 83, 118 S. Ct. 1003 (1998).
Southwest Marine,28 F. Supp.2d at 586.

'3
3

136Id.
17Id.

12

at 585.
Id. at 586-87.
Id. at 586.
Steel Co., 118 S. Ct. at 1017-20.
Id. at 1019.
Southwest Marine, 28 F. Supp.2d at 586.

143

Id.

'3
"3
'4
'41

'" Id.
145 See City of Los Angeles v. Lyons, 461 U.S. 95, 102 (1983). The Supreme Court in Lyons stated that a court must
inquire
into the justiciability of an injunctive remedy, irrespective of a damages claim. The court in Southwest Marine noted that this
requirement is not the same when a plaintiff has standing to pursue injunctive relief and civil damages. Southwest Marine, 28 F.
Sups.2d at 587 n.3.
Id. at 586-87.
14 149 F.3d 303 (4 Cir. 1998).
14 See Friends of the Earth, Inc. v. Laidlaw Envtl. Servs. (TOC), Inc., 956 F. Supp. 588, 600-11 (D.S.C. 1997).
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plaintiffs' injuries under Article III."' In Southwest Marine, however, the court restated that NRDC had
alleged both past and continuing violations of the CWA.is0 Finding no allegations of any discontinuation
of Southwest's alleged wrongdoing, the court determined Laidlaw to be distinguishable and non-binding
on the case at bar.''
The court concluded its discussion of judicial precedent in citizen-suits by stating that "no case
holds that a party bringing a citizen suit is precluded altogether by Article III from seeking civil penalties
in any circumstance, especially when civil penalties are sought in conjunction with other forms of relief
for ongoing violations."s 2 In making this assertion, the court expressly referenced Dubois v. US
DepartmentofAgriculture.53 In Dubois, a citizen-plaintiffs' claim for civil penalties was dismissed as
moot despite plaintiffs' claim for injunctive relief for ongoing violations of the CWA.'" The court's
decision in Dubois stands in direct contrast to the above quotation from Southwest Marine. In
distinguishing Dubois from Southwest Marine,the court noted that Dubois was not on point and nonbinding on the instant decision.'
The court restated the purpose of the CWA was to "restore and maintain the chemical, physical,
and biological integrity of the Nation's waters."'5 The court emphasized the importance of citizen-suits
as a valuable tool for enforcing the provisions of the Act,'5 7 and noted its "duty to follow the plain
language" of the CWA.'" Finding no binding case law in opposition to the statutory language of the Act,
the court denied Southwest's motion to preclude civil penalties holding that NRDC had standing to seek
civil damages under the CWA because NRDC also sought injunctive relief for ongoing violations of the
Act. 5 9
V. COMMENT

After the Supreme Court's decision in Steel Co. v. Citizensfor a Better Environment'6oand the
subse 5uent lower court decisions in Friendsofthe Earth,Inc. v. Laidlaw Environmental Services (TOC),
Inc.,16 and Dubois v. US. Department ofAgriculture,162 the question has arisen whether plaintiffs in
citizen-suits will ever have standing to pursue civil penalties for violations of the CWA. These cases
addressed the justiciability of civil penalties in the context of citizen-suit claims, but have avoided
addressing this ultimate issue. 6 1 Consequently, the courts have given no definitive answer as to whether
citizen-plaintiffs will ever have standing to recover civil penalties in future suits filed under the CWA.
Laidlaw and Dubois both indicate that citizen-plaintiffs will have difficulty ever recovering civil
penalties for violations of the CWA. After these decisions, an allegation of ongoing violations, though
adequate to confer standing, will often be inadequate to lead to an ultimate award of civil penalties.
Laidlaw and Dubois extend the doctrine of mootness to enable defendants to avoid payment of civil
penalties by simply coming into compliance with the Act. '" This compliance will moot the citizenplaintiffs injunctive claim and leave only the plaintiffs claim for civil penalties. Pursuant to Laidlaw
and Dubois' the court's interpretation of Steel Co. in the claim for civil damages will not stand on its own
Id.

'

15 Southwest Marne, 28 F. Supp.2d at 585.
Id. at 584-87.
Id. at 587.

20 F. Supp.2d 263 (D.N.H. 1998).
1 Dubois v. U.S. Dep't of Agric., 20 F. Supp.2d 263,268 (D.N.H. 1998).
"' Southwest Marine, 28 F. Supp.2d at 586 nd.
56

33 U.S.C. § 1251 (1994).

" Southwest Marine, 28 F. Supp.2d at 587.
18

Id.

'" Id. at 586-87.
'6 523 U.S. 83, 118
16
6'
63
'6

S. Ct. 1003 (1998).

149 F.3d 303 (4"h Cir. 1998).

20 F. Supp.2d 263 (D.NH. 1998).
See Dubois v. U.S. Dept of Agric., 20 F. Supp.2d 263, 266 n.3 (D.N.H. 1998).
Id. at 263; Friends of the Earth, Inc. v. Laidlaw Envtl. Servs. (TOC), Inc., 149 F.3d 303 (4 Cir. 1998).
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and will become moot for failure to redress the plaintiff's injuries under Article 111.16' Although this
result would lead to a temporary discontinuation of the alleged wrongdoing, the preclusion of civil
penalties will discourage the filing of citizen-suits in the future.'"
In contrast to Laidlaw and Dubois, the court in NaturalResources Defense Council v. Southwest
Marine, Inc. supports the proposition that civil penalties should be recoverable in citizen suits where
plaintiffs allege ongoing violations of the CWA at the time the suit is filed.167 The court's decision
sustains the viability of citizen suits by distinguishing Laidlaw and Steel Co.'6 1 Southwest Marine rejects
the proposition that civil penalties may never redress a citizen-plaintiff's injuries. Instead, Southwest
Marine would preclude recovery of civil penalties only when allegations of wholly past violations are
asserted.' 69
Though Southwest Marine upholds the citizen-plaintiff's right to recover civil damages in the
instant case, the decision is incomplete as the court does not reach any conclusion regarding the possible
mooting of the plaintiffs' injunctive claim. This discussion was unnecessary in the instant case because
the defendants never asserted compliance with the CWA. Southwest Marine, though important for
upholding a citizen-plaintiff's right to acquire standing to seek civil penalties when alleging ongoing
violations of the CWA, is limited in precedential importance as to the issue of mootness. Thus, the key
issue of potential post-complaint compliance by defendants remained unaddressed.
Clearly, the federal courts' view of standing and mootness in CWA citizen-suit claims is
disjointed and confusing. As of the present date, concerned private citizens and environmental
organizations have little guidance regarding their rights to pursue civil penalties against alleged violators
of the CWA and other environmental statutes with similar citizen-suit provisions. A more definitive
statement of the law would greatly benefit all those concerned with the future viability of citizen-suits to
enforce the provisions of the CWA.
The opportunity for the courts to recapitulate their view of standing and mootness in CWA
citizen-suit actions has recently presented itself. On March 1, 1999, the Supreme Court granted certiorari
to review the Fourth Circuit's decision in Friends of the Earth,Inc. v. Laidlaw EnvironmentalServices
(TOC), Inc.'70 Under review is whether citizen-plaintiffs in CWA suits have standing to seek civil
penalties when a plaintiffs claim for injunctive relief is determined to be moot.' 7 ' In Laidlaw, the district
court determined that because the defendants had discontinued the alleged wrongful acts before trial, the
plaintiffs' claim for injunctive relief became moot.'2 On appeal, the Fourth Circuit held that since the
plaintiffs' only claim was for civil penalties, the claim was moot for failure to redress the plaintiffs'
injuries pursuant to Article 111.17' Accordingly, the Supreme Court has been presented with the
opportunity to address the ramifications of a defendant's voluntary compliance after the filing of a CWA
citizen-suit on a plaintiffs civil penalty claim.
For the following reasons, this author asserts that the Supreme Court should overturn the Fourth
Circuit's decision in Laidlaw and clearly establish that a citizen-plaintiff s claim for civil penalties under
the CWA should remain justiciable - even upon the mooting of a plaintiff's claim for injunctive relief due
to a defendant's post-complaint compliance. The Court must make evident that ongoing violations of the
Act at the time the suit is filed will be sufficient to lead to a determination of the merits of a civil claim
for penalties.
First, reversal is warranted because the court in Laidlaw appears to have interpreted the Supreme
See Steel Co. v. Citizens for a Better Env't., 523 U.S. 83, 118 S. Ct. 1003 (1998).
16 See Jim Hecker, Citizen Standing to Suefor PastEPCRA Violations, 27 ENvT. L. REP. 10561 (1997).
167 Natural Resources Defense Council v. Southwest Marine, Inc., 28 F. Supp.2d 584, 585 (S.D. Cal.
1998), aff'd on reh'g,
1999 WL 155914 (S.D. Cal. 1999).
'6 Id. at 586-87.
169 Id. at 585.
o70
149 F.3d 303 (4 Cir. 1998), cert. granted,_ U.S. _, 119 S. Ct. 1111 (1999).
161

171 Id.
172
'73

Id. at 305.
Id. at 306-07.
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Court's holding in Steel Co. too broadly. 74 In Steel Co., the Court held that citizen-laintiffs do not have
standing to bring a claim for civil penalties for wholly past violations of the CWA.' Nowhere in its
decision did the Court state that a citizen-plaintiff may not recover civil penalties for ongoing violations
of the Act. As stated in Southwest Marine, construingSteel Co. to preclude recovery of civil penalties in
all cases would "represent a clear deviation from established case law and a major judicial intrusion on
remedies clearly provided for by Congress."' 76 The Court should take this opportunity to limit its holding
in Steel Co. to instances where plaintiffs solely allege past violations. In cases where ongoing violations
are shown, the Court must make clear that claims for civil penalties may not be avoided by postcomplaint compliance. This will ensure the justiciability of a citizen-plaintiff's claim upon a defendant's
post-complaint compliance.
.Furthermore, the Supreme Court must reassess its own reasoning in Steel Co. The Laidlaw court
expressly adopted Steel Co.'s holding that civil penalties paid to the federal government alone would not
stand for failure to redress a plaintiff's injuries under Article III.'" As stated throughout this Note, the
implications of this holding are tremendous. Interpreted broadly, Steel Co. could be read as precluding
civil penalties in all citizen-suits, regardless of whether ongoing violations are alleged.
This appeal will allow the Supreme Court to make clear that such a broad interpretation of Steel
Co. is erroneous. The Court may justify its determination by stating that when a citizen-plaintiff alleges
sufficient allegations of ongoing violations to confer standing, its claim for civil penalties will stand on its
own, regardless of later mooting of the plaintiff's injunctive claim. The civil-penalty claim will stand
individually because, unlike the Court's reasoning in Steel Co.,178 the claim will redress a plaintiff's
injury.'7 A plaintiff s injury will be redressed because the imposition of civil penalties payable to the
government will deter defendants from committing future violations.s 0 This deterrent effect will redress
a plaintiff's injuries and allow claims for civil penalties to remain justiciable under Article III."'
Third, a Supreme Court finding that civil penalties remain justiciable in citizen-suits may be
supported by important policy considerations. Clearly, allowing civil penalty claims to become moot
would weaken the deterrent effect of the CWA.182 Specifically, citizens would be discouraged from
filing citizen suits knowing that defendants could avoid payment of any penalties by simply coming into
See Natural Resources Defense Council v. Southwest Marine, Inc., 1999 WL 155914 at *1 (S.D. Cal. 1999).
Steel Co. v. Citizens for a Better Env't, 523 U.S. 83, _, 118 S. Ct. 1003, 1017-20 (1998).
Natural Resources Defense Council v. Southwest Marine, Inc., 28 F. Supp.2d 584, 585 (S.D. Cal. 1998), af'd on reh'g,
1999 WL 155914 (S.D. Cal. 1999). "A rule denying citizen-plaintiffs standing to seek civil penalties, whether or not there is an
allegation of ongoing injury or violation, would be a rather dramatic development in the law given that civil penalties payable to
the Treasury are an enforcement tool available in citizen suits under a number of environmental statutes." San Francisco
Baykeeper v. Vallejo Sanitation and Flood Control Dist., 1999 WL 115054 n.2 (E.D. Cal. 1999).
' Friends of the Earth, Inc. v. Laidlaw Envtl. Servs. (TOC), Inc., 149 F.3d 303, 306-07 (4h Cir. 1998), cerl. granted,_ U.S. _,
119 S. Ct. 1111 (1999).
In Steel Co., 118 S. Ct. at 1018-19. "
the civil penalties authorized by the [EPCRA] might be viewed as a sort of
compensation or redress to respondent if they were payable to the respondent. But they are not.... Relief that does not remedy
the injury suffered cannot bootstrap a plaintiff into federal court; that is the very essence of the redressability requirement." Id.
(eThasis added).
See Jim Hecker, Citizen Standing to Sue for PastEPCRA Violations, 27 ENvT. L. REP. 10561,
(1997).
'g The United States District Court for the Eastern District of California recently adopted this reasoning. "In the context of
ongoing violations, civil penalties are similar to injunctive relief They both deterfuture violations by a particulardefendant
thereby redressingthreatened hann to the plaintiff" San Francisco Baykeeper v. Vallejo Sanitation and Flood Control Dist.,
1999 WL 115054 at *2 (E.D. Cal. 1999) (emphasis added).
'8'See Natural Resources Defense Council v. Southwest Marine, Inc., 1999 WL 155914 at *3 (S.D. Cal. 1999). On rehearing,
the District Court for the Southern District of California adopts this view. "Defendant is properly focused on the injury, but, for
the above stated reasons, i.e. because civil penalties can remedy Plaintiffs' asserted injuries by deterring Defendant's alleged
violations, the Court concludes that civil penalties awarded to the U.S. Treasury may remedy the Plaintiffs' injuries." Id.
18 "The availability of civil penalties encourages citizens to bring suits to remedy and deter violations. 'Citizen plaintiffs
often initiate suit not to recover monetary awards for their own benefit, but rather to ensure that penalties are imposed so as to
deter future violations.' If citizens could not seek civil penalties for past violations, they would be unable to recover their costs of
identifying violators. As a result, citizens' incentive to investigate violators and to file citizen suits would be greatly reduced."
Hecker, infra note 179, at - (citing Atlantic States Legal Found. v. Pan Am. Tanning Corp., 990 F.2d 1017, 1021 (2' Cir.
1993)).
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compliance with the Act. This would destroy the deterrent effect provided by the imposition of civil
penalties.'13 A policy that would allow such easy avoidance of civil penalties would disserve the purpose
of the Act - the protection of the nation's waterways. The award of civil penalties must be protected to
ensure the future viability of the CWA.
Finally, the Court must reverse Laidlaw because of the Fourth Circuit's failure to apply the
voluntary-cessation exception. The Fourth Circuit's decision flies in the face of established judicial
precedent. In seven other circuit courts of appeal, the voluntary-cessation exception has been applied in
CWA suits to hold that claims for civil penalties remain justiciable even upon the mooting of a citizenplaintiff's injunctive claim. '" More importantly, the Supreme Court itself has applied the exception to
cases involving post-complaint compliance by defendants outside the CWA context.
In its review of
Laidlaw, the Court should follow the precedent set by the various circuits and extend the voluntarycessation exception to cover CWA suits.
By limiting Steel Co. to suits alleging solely past CWA violations and by allowing civil penalties
to redress a citizen-plaintiff's injuries, the Court will ensure the applicability of the voluntary-cessation
exception to CWA citizen-suits. This will enable a citizen-plaintiff's civil penalty claim to remain
justiciable if ongoing violations are established at the time the suit is filed, regardless of the possible
mooting of any injunctive claims due to a defendant's post-complaint actions.
VI. CONCLUSION
In its review of Laidlaw, the Supreme Court must make clear that the mooting of a claim for
injunctive relief due to a defendant's post-complaint compliance does not moot the remaining claim for
civil penalties in CWA citizen-suits. By establishing that claims for civil penalties will remain justiciable
when ongoing violations are alleged, the Court will ensure the viability of future citizen suits. By
extending the voluntary-cessation exception to cover CWA suits, citizens concerned with enforcing the
Act will have knowledge that civil penalty claims properly alleging ongoing violation will not be mooted
by later compliance by defendants. The Court should follow the lead set by NaturalResources Defense
Council v. Southwest Marine, Inc. by protecting the rights of citizens to pursue suits under the CWA. A
policy such as this will lead to more effective enforcement of the CWA by concerned private citizens and
environmental organizations and will serve to further the goals behind the Act.
BRETT A. WILLIAMS
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'8 See Comfort Lake Ass'n, Inc. v. Dresel Contracting Inc., 138 F.3d 351 (8 Cir. 1998); Atlantic States Legal Found. v.
Stroh Die Castin Co., 116 F.3d 814, 820 (7h Cir. 1997); Natural Resources Defense Council v. Texaco Ref. & Mktg. Inc., 2
F.3d 493,503 (3 Cir. 1993); Atlantic States Legal Found., Inc. v. Pan Am. Tanning Corp., 993 F.2d 1017, 1021 (2 Cir. 1993);
Carr v. Alta Verde Indus. Inc., 931 F.2d 1055, 1065 n. 9 (5t Cir. 1991); Atlantic States Legal Found. v. Tyson Foods Inc., 897
F.2d 1128 (1 1h Cir. 1991); Pawtuxent Cove Marina Inc. v. Ciba-Geigy Corp., 807 F.2d 1089, 1094 (l Cir. 1986).
...See Northeastern Fla. Chapter of the Associated Gen. Contractors of Am. v. Jacksonville, 508 U.S. 656 (1993). "...[AJ
defendant's voluntary cessation of a challenged practice does not deprive a federal court of its power to determine the legality of
the practice." Id. at 662, citing City of Mesquite v. Aladdin's Castle, Inc., 455 U.S. 283, 289 (1982).
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